I= THE IDEAL OF FREE WILL AND DETERMINATION IN ANGLO AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY DURING 1969-80, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO STUART HAMPSHIRE, ANTHONY KENNY, P.F STRAWSON, AND DONALD DAVIDSON
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Title of Thesis
THE IDEAL OF FREE WILL AND DETERMINATION IN ANGLO AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY DURING 1969-80, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO STUART HAMPSHIRE, ANTHONY KENNY, P.F STRAWSON, AND DONALD DAVIDSON

Author(s)
Zahoor-UL-Hassan
Institute/University/Department Details
Department of Philosophy/ University of Karachi
Session
2002
Subject
Philosophy
Number of Pages
205
Keywords (Extracted from title, table of contents and abstract of thesis)
free will, determination, anglo american philosophy, stuart hampshire, anthony kenny, p.f strawson, donald davidson, libertarianism, determinism, compa1ibilism, compatibilism

Abstract
The philosophical problem of free will and degeneration of human actions emerging out of a profound conflict between two beliefs. The belief in freedom of human action appears to contradict the belief that all human actions are caused, and therefore determined, by physical or material factors beyond an individual's control. Freedom of action is usually conceived as freedom from the laws of nature. This is broadly called libertarianism. On the other hand, the view that all occurrences in nature, including human actions, are caused by physical conditions subsumable under causal laws is called determinism. Reconciliation between freedom and determinism falls under the position called compa1ibilism, which broadly advocates the view that human actions are both caused as well as free. Denial of the possibility of this reconciliation leads to a fourth position called compatibilism. This involves the view that beliefs in freedom and determinism are contradictory to each other and therefore cannot be held together. It seems that we cannot give up any of these two beliefs, however contradictory they might appear to the philosophical mind.

In my dissertation, the views of Anglo-American philosophers, Stuart Hampshire, Anthony Kenny, P. F. Strawson, and Donald Davidson are examined on this problem. However, examination of their views has left many questions unanswered and many more questions arising out of this perennial problem.

Keeping in view the immense complexity of the problem at hand, it seems impossible to offer a final solution acceptable to all. Nevertheless, description and analysis of the views of the philosophers in this dissertation is attempted in order to expose many serious problems, which would have remained unapprised. It is a central contention of my thesis that the freedom of action cannot be understood without explaining the nature of self-consciousness. I intend to. argue, through examination of the views of these philosophers,. that the paradigm of causality in nature cannot explain human actions that originate by self-conscicus mental acts. Deterministic explanations have their limits where the nature of self-consciousness is in question.

Download Full Thesis
1894.81 KB
S. No. Chapter Title of the Chapters Page Size (KB)
1 0 Contents
61.45 KB
2 1 Description analysis of the of the view of Stuart Hampshire 17
618.06 KB
  1.1 Two Kinds of Knowledge 20
  1.2 The Non-Propositional Knowledge 29
  1.3 Self-consciousness and Freedom 33
  1.4 Knowledge of Caused and Freedom 38
  1.5 Consciousness and Epiphenomenalism 42
  1.6 Thoughts and Action 46
  1.7 Desires, Thoughts and Freedom 50
  1.8 Knowledge of Desires 54
  1.9 Freedom and Knowledge 57
3 2 Description and analysis of the views of Anthony Kenny 65
451.71 KB
  2.1 Kenny on Compatibilism 67
  2.2 The Contingency of Practical Reasoning 72
  2.3 Description of Actions 74
  2.4 Validity of the ordinary descriptions 79
  2.5 Vacuity of the ordinary descriptions 81
  2.6 Freedom and Defeasibility 86
  2.7 Psychological of Compatibilism 92
  2.8 The incoherence and Compatibilism 95
  2.9 Self-consciousness and Compatibilism 98
  2.10 Compatibilism and incompatibility view of event-action relation 104
4 3 Description and analysis of the views of Peter Strawson 110
406.83 KB
  3.1 Consequences of Determinism 111
  3.2 Objective attitude and determinism 115
  3.3 The Irrelevance of Determinism 117
  3.4 Repudiation of Reactive attitude 119
  3.5 The Illusion of Free Will 124
  3.6 Incoherence of Pessimists and optimists 131
  3.7 Choice and Truth 144
5 4 Description and Analysis of the view of Donald Davidson 149
359.85 KB
  4.1 Actions, reasons Causes 157
  4.2 Intentionality of reasons 159
  4.3 The Logical connection Argument 161
  4.4 Events and Non-events 165
  4.5 The Cause of Reasons 167
  4.6 Priority of the Mental 185
6 5 Conclusion 185
77.77 KB
7 6 Bibliography 193
162.56 KB